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Abstract  
The premature sexualisation of young people is a source of intense public anxiety, often framed as 
an unprecedented crisis. Concurrently, a critical scholarship highlights problematic assumptions 
underpinning this discourse, including a positioning of young people as morally compromised 
passive subjects, and a disconnect between the reductionist framework and the complexity of young 
peoples’ lived experiences. Drawing from ethnographic research in a London school, in this article I 
argue that by attending to the everyday lives of pupils, a more nuanced picture of moral and sexual 
change and continuity emerges. Using the framework of ‘ordinary ethics’, which identifies ethics as 
pervasive in speech and action, I demonstrate the multiple ways by which young people define and 
act according to what they consider sexually good and right. In this way the analytical focus is shifted 
from passivity to activity and we can appreciate how young people today are evincing a sexual ethics 
of force and efficacy. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, the ‘premature sexualisation’ of young people has become a source of intense public 
anxiety, argued by a number of high-profile commentators to represent an unprecedented crisis 
facing the next generation (e.g. Biddulph, 2013; Hinshaw & Kranz, 2009). A body of academic, 
government and popular literature cites a host of pressures stemming from our ‘sex-saturated’ 
contemporary context, particularly in relation to the media and consumerism, that are negatively 
impacting both the present and future of young subjects, particularly girls (e.g. APA, 2007; Bailey, 
2011; Papadopoulos, 2010). Meanwhile, a critical commentary on this ‘crisis narrative’ of 
sexualisation notes the rhetorical dimensions of the literature (Smith & Attwood, 2011), the classed 
and gendered ideal of childhood innocence/protection (Renold & Ringrose, 2011) and the historical 
precedent of public anxiety concerning the morally corrupting influence of ‘modern times’ (Egan & 
Hawkes, 2008). As such, scholars have argued that sexualisation says more about the anxieties of 
adults rather than the lived experiences of young people (Kehily, 2012; Smith & Attwood, 2011). 
Empirical research on sexuality within school (e.g. Charles, 2010; Epstein, 1997; Hey, 1997; Mac an 
Ghaill, 1994; Renold, 2000; Youdell, 2005) can be viewed as a counterpart to this critical 
commentary, illuminating the complex realities of growing up in a sex-saturated society (Epstein, 
Kehily, & Renold, 2012). 
This article contributes to the scholarship on school as a key site for the production of young 
sexualities, as well as the critical response to the simplifying logic of the sexualisation discourse. 
Specifically, my aim is to highlight the ethical dimensions of the sexual experiences, identifications 
and understandings of young people in school. Using the anthropological framework of ‘ordinary 
ethics’ (Lambek, 2010a, 2010b) to analyse my ethnographic data, I argue that while the sexualisation 
discourse positions young people as passive and morally compromised (see Egan & Hawkes, 2008), 
attention to the everyday actions of pupils illuminates the intrinsic and pervasive nature of ethical 
action in school. Pupils are manifesting sexual ethics1 of great ‘force and efficacy’ (Keane, 2010, p. 
68) and acting upon clear ideas of sexual rights and wrongs. They are premised on a gendered 
criteria by which the expression of an active sexuality is judged ‘good’ for boys and ‘bad’ for girls 
(who are named as sluts, slags or skets). We may not agree with these judgements but it is 
nonetheless important to recognise these actions as ethical. As Lambek writes, ‘We do not have to 
agree on the moral value of any particular practice to understand that it is constituted as a moral 
practice’ (2008, p. 134). Failure to recognise pupils’ actions as ethical does not do justice to the 
complex realities of being and becoming a sexual person in contemporary society. 
Context: Sexualisation and moral crisis 
In the last decade the ‘premature sexualisation’ of children and young people has been addressed in 
government commissioned reports (e.g. APA, 2007; Australian Senate, 2008; Bailey, 2011; 
Papadopoulos, 2010), political and popular commentary and a wide body of popular and academic 
publications (e.g. Biddulph, 2013; Hinshaw & Kranz, 2009). Sexualisation is defined as ‘the imposition 
of adult sexuality on to children and young people before they are capable of dealing with it, 
mentally, emotionally or physically’ (Papadopoulos, 2010, p. 6). Centrally, the proliferation of 
representations of sex and sexualised imagery in the media are identified as a prime cause of 
sexualisation. Sexualisation is linked to a ‘variety of harmful consequences’ (APA, 2007, p. 2) 
including cognitive impairment, mental health problems, low self-esteem and pressure (for girls) to 
appear sexually available. 
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Concurrently, a critical academic discussion of sexualisation has highlighted a number of problematic 
assumptions within this discourse and questioned the analytical usefulness of sexualisation as a 
concept. In its contemporary use, process and outcome are fused, ‘conflating a whole range of 
textual forms, behaviours, attitudes, states, interests and practices, and presenting it as a singular 
object of concern’ (Smith & Attwood, 2011, p. 329). The effects are overarching, so that 
sexualisation becomes ‘a non sequitur causing everything from girls flirting with older men to child 
sex trafficking’ (Egan & Hawkes, 2008, p. 297). Furthermore, Egan and Hawkes (2012) argue that 
while contemporary sexualisation is framed as an unprecedented crisis, moral panic over loss of 
innocence, the sexual corruption of children and the pernicious effects of the media has been 
recurrent over the past 150 years (see also Duschinsky, 2013). Running through historical and 
contemporary accounts is a construction of children as passive, incomplete and in need of 
protection, underpinned by a one-way model of socialisation—from adults to children: 
‘In that sexualization impinges upon or corrupts a passive recipient, both present and future 
are morally compromised. This understanding of childhood absents the possibility of 
children as active agents in their own lives thus intensifying the level of danger inherent in 
sexualisation’. (Egan & Hawkes, 2008, p. 299) 
Critiquing these reductive assumptions is not to deny changes in sexual attitudes and practices since 
the 1960s. These have included an increase in teenage sexual activity and a decrease in average age 
of first sexual intercourse, in the context of an increasingly sexualised media (Moore & Rosenthal, 
1993; Jackson & Scott, 2004).2 Scholars have discussed ways to support and promote ‘sexual agency, 
sexual rights, and sexual health for girls and women’ (Lerum & Dworkin, 2009, p. 252), without 
harking back to the (imagined) past of girlhood innocence and virginity (Lamb & Peterson, 2012; 
Ringrose & Renold, 2012). 
Sexualities in school 
While the voices and experiences of real children and young people are the ‘absent centre’ of the 
sexualisation debates (Epstein, Kehily, & Renold, 2012, p. 252), they are closely attended to in a 
body of ethnographic research on sexualities in school. These produce significantly more complex 
and illuminating results. Foucault and Butler’s poststructuralist frameworks have been particularly 
influential for scholars who examine school as a key site for the production, performance and 
regulation of normative sexual and gendered identities. For example, Mac an Ghaill’s research in 
secondary schools (1994) focuses on masculinities, while Hey (1997), Youdell (2005) and Charles 
(2010) focus on femininities and Epstein (1997) and Renold (2000) focus on both boys and girls in 
primary school. 
Recurrent in this literature is the recognition of a pervasive ‘heterosexual matrix’ (Butler, 1990) 
within which acceptable forms of masculinity or femininity are produced (and policed) through 
expectations of compulsory heterosexuality. And analysis of ‘slag/slut’ discourses of feminine sexual 
impropriety as part of this matrix (Charles, 2010; Hey, 1997; Renold, 2000; Payne, 2010; Youdell, 
2005). Building on an earlier identification of a punitive sexual double standard, by which ‘an active, 
desiring sexuality is positively regarded in men, but denigrated and regulated by negative labelling in 
women’ (Jackson & Cram, 2003, p. 113; see also Cowie & Lees, 1981; Lees, 1986; Thomas, 1959), 
these discourses are identified as powerful categories for the policing and regulation of not only 
appropriate sexual identities but also appropriate gender identities. As Hey writes, ‘In this economy, 
the incentive of ‘othering’ was enormous—how else could you claim to be normal, acceptably 
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attractive and OK? It is all those other girls who are made to carry the bad bits of femininity’ (Hey, 
1997, p. 75). 
Youdell (2005) identifies these as discourses of ‘feminine sexual morality (and immorality)’ (259). It is 
the specifically moral implications of the workings of the category of slag that I seek to explore 
further in this article. As Lambek, writes, ‘Ethnographers commonly find that the people they 
encounter are trying to do what they consider right and good, are being evaluated according to a 
criteria of what is right and good, or are in some debate about what constitutes the human good’ 
(2010a, p. 1). However, their subsequent analysis does not account for the importance of the ethical 
in people’s lives, but focuses instead ‘on rules, power, interest, and desire as forces or motivations 
for action’ (2010b, p. 40). At the same time, to analyse in terms of ethics is not to ‘forget all we know 
about structure, cultural mediation, social interpellation, violence, subjectivity, and psychic conflict’ 
(p. 42), Thus, analysing ‘slagginess’ within a framework of ordinary ethics is not to deny the post-
structuralist insights into regulation and power, discussed above. Instead, introducing another facet 
to the analysis can further help us understand young people’s perspectives, motivations and what is 
at stake in the policing of sexuality. 
Ordinary ethics 
Recent anthropological work on ‘ordinary ethics’ (contributions in Lambek, 2010; Mattingly, 2012, 
2013; Stafford, 2013) foregrounds the everyday as a key site of moral work. In contrast to the 
historical dominance of Durkheim within anthropology, and his focus on morality in terms of 
obligation and rule, this approach focuses attention on the ethical dimensions of action, practice and 
sociality (Lambek, 2010a). ‘It directs attention to the problem of action and judgment in an ordinary 
world’ (Mattingly, 2013, p. 308) and as such opens up conceptual space to account for the 
contingencies, riskiness and vagaries of everyday action and experience. By viewing ethics as 
intrinsic to speech and action, the sociality of ethics is also emphasised. As Keane (2010) notes, 
ethical acts such as justifying, accusing and persuading cannot be understood outside the context of 
interaction with other people. 
Elaborating an ‘ethics of action’, Lambek (2010b) emphasises the fundamental concepts of 
judgement and criteria. In everyday practice, we are constantly exercising judgement in relation to 
ourselves, others, situations and actions. We use criteria to make these judgements; for example 
how to conduct ourselves, whether to commit a certain act, for what reason and in what way. 
Criteria are also the grounds for deciding what constitutes a kind of act, for deciding if acts have 
been committed correctly or legitimately, and for evaluating our own and others’ actions. At the 
same time while criteria shapes the way we act, it does not determine it. Criteria are often implicit, 
part of the judgement itself, but they can also be consciously considered and debated. Some criteria 
are continuous or enduring, but, at other times, new criteria are brought into effect or applied to 
different people or contexts. 
 Lambek (2010b) argues that performative acts (including formal ones such as changes in the law) 
can recalibrate criteria and ‘shift the ethical context. Thus there is a whole ethics to history and 
social change’ (p. 56). As we will see, recalibration of ethical criteria happens within school as pupils 
grow up. But we can also consider larger scale recalibration, while the ‘sexual double standard’ still 
persists, the criteria by which feminine promiscuity/propriety is judged has shifted, for example in 
terms of the relative importance of marriage, the age threshold considered appropriate for sex, or 
the acceptable amount of sexual partners. Starting with Lambek’s identification of the importance of 
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the ethical in ordinary life (2010a, p. 1), and utilising the concepts of criteria and judgement, I seek 
to direct attention in the following analysis to the multiple instances of judgement, discussion, 
dilemma or action by which young people define and act, according to what they consider good and 
right. Ethical reflection, judgement and action on sex acts are a common feature of school life. Pupils 
base these judgements on gendered criteria that evaluate the actions of girls differently to the 
actions of boys. 
Method and results 
Collingson School (the name of the school and the names of all pupils are pseudonyms) is a large, 
non-selective, mixed-sex school, in a London suburb. The data for this article is drawn from 14-
months of ethnographic research within the school, focusing mainly on the Year 11 group, 15- to 16-
year-olds in their last year of compulsory schooling. As well as attending their lessons, I spent lunch 
and break-times with pupils and attended assemblies, non-curriculum days, school plays and other 
outside class activities. I also observed a range of classes and extra-curricular activities among other 
year groups and conducted unstructured interviews among pupils and staff. 
My research focuses on Year 11’s ‘informal realm’. This is the network of peer relations and 
hierarchies concentrated within spatial and temporal spheres—the playground and external 
corridors, lunch and break-times—outside of formal adult control or participation (Amit-Talai, 1995; 
Willis, 1977). Ethics is a pervasive dimension of pupils’ action and interaction and a structuring 
dimension of the informal realm. Discussion, evaluation and commentary on violations of 
appropriate speech and action are a constant feature of peer interactions in school (see Shuman, 
1986; Goodwin, 2006). Furthermore, pupils often act upon these judgements, for example by 
punishing the ‘perpetrator’. These actions themselves are subsequently ethically reflected upon, 
commented upon and evaluated by peers. 
Ordinary ethics in school 
One lunch time, as a group of pupils stand around chatting in a tucked-away part of the 
school grounds, I get into a conversation with Michael and Caroline that leads us, in a round-
about-way to the subject of ‘slags’. Caroline has a reputation for knowing all the gossip from 
the year, so Michael takes this opportunity to mine her for information. ‘Who’s the biggest 
slag in the year?’ Caroline doesn’t need time to think, ‘Kadia, she’s the biggest slag.’ Michael 
looks surprised, ‘I would never have thought that!’ ‘Yeah, the whole long story is that she 
was with someone, and then they broke up, but she carried on doing stuff with him, and at 
the same time she was doing stuff with other people. But then she realised that wasn’t the 
right thing to do. I think she regrets it now, but lots of people are going to see her negatively 
because of it.’  
After the bell rings to signify the end of lunch, I walk with Sejal to our next lesson. She was 
not part of the conversation, and I had not noticed her listening, but once we are out of the 
earshot of the others, she turns to me, saying in a confidential tone, ‘I’ll be looking at people 
differently now, some people look so innocent.’ 
On another occasion I am talking with Kadia and Samiya about the episode. Kadia says that it 
was a really hard time, ‘the thing was, what I did wasn’t bad, it was just something between 
two people’. Samiya says that most of their group, the ‘It girls’, have been ‘terrorised’ by the 
high status ‘Man-dom’ boys at some point, usually because of perceived ‘skettish’ 
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behaviour. Once a leader has decided to stop speaking to them, the other boys are expected 
to fall in line, and if one of them ‘breaks out’ they are at risk of getting ‘rushed’ [beaten up]. I 
asked Kadia how she felt when this happened to her, ‘after all the hassle I got, when they 
stopped talking to me and left me alone, it was actually a relief’. 
This story highlights ordinary ethics in school, all the pupils in this story, Caroline, Michael and Sejal, 
Samiya, Kadia and the Man-dom boys are evaluating actions, exercising judgement and coming to 
conclusions about what is right or wrong premised on a set of shared, but contestable criteria—what 
actions make someone a slag, that it is wrong to be a slag and that it is right to act on this 
judgement. Furthermore, this is a criteria applied only to girls. Boys’ actions are assessed by a 
different criteria. While slag is the main discourse of impropriety for girls, gay is the main discourse 
of impropriety for boys. Illustrating the ‘heterosexual matrix’ (Butler, 1990) judgement of ‘gayness’ 
did not stem from heterosexual activity—of which there were no public stories. Rather it was 
applied to those boys who did not engage in heterosexual interactions, such as repetitive sex talk 
between peers, demonstration of sexual knowledge and expertise and sexual encounters with girls. 
It was also applied to those who did not engage in conventionally masculine practices and 
interactions, such as sport, play-fighting or banter. To be judged as a ‘good boy’ by peers, it is 
necessary to be viewed as heterosexual, grounded in a criteria in which male interest in, and pursuit 
of, sex is rightly potent, active and  ‘always on the mind’. While ‘gay’ as a discourse of male 
impropriety is drawn from a criteria of ‘not enough’, ‘slag’ as a discourse of female impropriety is 
drawn from a criteria of ‘too much’. 
Slaggy actions 
Sexual acts are evaluated by pupils in context: when, with whom, with how many people, how many 
times and in what timeframe the sexual acts occurred. It is from these criteria that slagginess is 
identified between peers. The same act, for example having sex, can be judged as right or wrong, 
depending on the transformations that surround it. 
Georgia: People think that sex is bad but in a relationship you’ve made a commitment to 
that person. But if you’re doing stuff outside of a relationship then it’s kind of, what people 
see is different, like you’re not going to commit to that one person. 
Drawing on the work of Rappaport (1999, cited in Lambek, 2010b), Lambek describes performative 
actions, both in ritual and everyday life, which change the criteria by which subsequent action is 
judged. So, agreeing to be ‘boyfriend’ and ‘girlfriend’ is a performative act that changes the criteria 
from which the sex act is judged. As long a girl is only having sex with her boyfriend, it is judged 
acceptable. One-off sex outside a relationship is more open to debate. Michael suggests that ‘it 
depends why it happens, if you’re being really cheap about it, like if you have a drunken one night 
stand, then that can get you branded as a slut’. Samiya, discussing a girl from another school who 
got pregnant, judged, ‘she’s not a slag though, because she only had sex once and it was an 
accident’. 
Slagginess becomes especially salient in combinations of repetition, quantity of partners and 
timeframe: 
Michael: You can’t say that a slut is a girl who’s slept with a lot of men, because it depends 
on the time period and the situation. If you’ve been mainly completely pissed at parties and 
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you’ve slept with a different guy every night for three weeks then that is a slut…but if it was 
over the course of two years… 
In explaining to me what makes a slag, Michael illustrated his point with hypothetical examples. But 
reflections on the (assumed to be) real actions of peers, such as Samiya’s above, were common in 
school—fuelled by the constant exchange of information and flagged by peers as occasions of 
transgression and the focus for judgement. 
Looking like a slag/acting like a slag; transgressions beyond sexual acts 
So far I have discussed how the slag discourse is established by pupils within interactions of 
judgement; drawing from a contextualised criteria of sexual acts. However, the slag discourse was 
not only articulated in evaluations of sexual acts and their contexts. It was also brought into action 
within evaluations of action and appearance, it comes to stand for more general transgressions of 
gendered speech, action and appearance and this intensifies its potency. Michael initially attempts a 
definition that relies solely on a classification of sexual acts: ‘What I’m saying is that a girl being 
slutty is not the way she looks but the way she acts, there are sort of general things slutty girls wear 
but a slutty girl is mainly determined by her actions.’ Then he draws on a more ambiguous definition 
that centralises the way things appear, ‘it’s a combination of two things; they wear unbelievably 
revealing things, like to church’. James continues, ‘And you say like “hello” to them and they have 
their legs open.’ 
So being a slut is evidenced in terms of unethical sexual actions, but can also be based on negative 
evaluations—appearing in the wrong way—without sex acts being at the origins of this judgement. 
That being named a slag is so potent, yet often comes to stand for something more general, means it 
is a powerful and flexible discourse through which pupils police and shape each other and 
themselves in terms of appropriate speech, action and appearance. 
Being a slag 
Through the two routes discussed above—ethical judgement derived from contextualised sex acts 
(presumed to be true and accurate), and ethical judgements derived from inappropriate action and 
appearance—certain girls in school were ‘shaped as publicly known moral characters’, as slags, and 
came to serve as ‘public models or exemplars with respect to which actions can be orientated, 
reasons given, justifications made’ (Keane, 2010, p. 75). As Michael put it, ‘you know how you get an 
FDA stamp of approval on chicken and stuff, it’s like that’. 
Paige was one such figure. Rumours abounded about her and her group, the Blonde Barbies, and 
their sexual antics outside school. As Lexy told me, ‘they have these parties every weekend, they go 
around saying ‘do you want to have sex with me? Do you want me to give you a hand job?’ 
Regardless of the truth of these rumours, Paige being named a slag was justified by her 
transgressions of action and appearance within school. Overweight, wearing very short skirts, thick 
black eyeliner and with backcombed, peroxide-dyed hair—she was visible, but judged as 
transgressive in this visibility. 
Furthermore, her actions were judged unethical according to criteria around ‘how friends should act’ 
and ‘how girls should act’. Paige was ‘not nice’, she openly admitted liking to ‘stir things up’, 
criticising others overtly (rather than covertly in the gender appropriate form of bitching). Her overt 
attempts to extend her intersubjective influence, judged negatively as ‘acting big’ also transgressed 
ideas of appropriate feminine action: 
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Samiya: They just think they’re big, you know. Like they’re not scared of anyone. 
Marina: No one likes them, they’re only friends with each other. But no one stands up to 
them, and everyone pretends to like Paige because she has these parties every weekend. 
And the thing is, all the boys like her because she’ll give them blow jobs. 
 
The figure of the slag offers girls an important ‘other’ to which they can define themselves in 
contrast (Hey, 1997). Within school, the ethical task of making oneself into a certain kind of person 
(Laidlaw, 2002) is embarked upon in constant relation to peers. As is the case in the conversation 
above, Paige—the figure of a slag—enabled a collective response by which Samiya and Marina, even 
though they were members of different peer groups, could define themselves as ‘different but 
appropriate’ in contrast to the Barbies who were ‘different but inappropriate’. 
Judging the flow of sexual knowledge 
While so far I have highlighted ordinary ethics, judgements made from gendered criteria that can be 
traced historically, pupils were also engaging with the proliferation of sexual knowledge and 
representations circulating in public culture, with access to the internet at home and on their phones 
and to multi-channel television. However, the sexualisation discourse rests on the assumption that 
young people are passive recipients of these ‘damaging messages’, whereas my research showed 
pupils actively judging cultural products according to the ethical criteria discussed above. 
Few girls positioned themselves as sexual innocents. Indeed, most balanced knowingness about sex 
with an ethical commentary on this flow of sexual knowledge. During my fieldwork, a blog, 
supposedly written by a 17-year-old girl from a different area of London, was transferred from 
phone to phone and was sent to me by Grace after it became the talk of the school. The blog was a 
seven chapter saga of the diarist’s sexual exploits, recounting in great detail her sexual encounters 
with a series of boys and written in slang and abbreviated ‘text speak’. As a cultural product, the 
blog would confirm parents worst fears about ‘sexualisation’, ‘crises of morality’ and uses of 
technology among the young. The day after she passed it to me, Grace was eager to know if I had 
read it. I asked her what she thought of it. She was unequivocal in her ethical judgement, ‘I thought 
it was absolutely disgusting, that girl is a complete sket.’ 
For boys, judging the flow of sexual knowledge was less important than the display of it. This 
knowledge informed much of the ‘sex talk’ between boys without the necessity of having to interact 
with real girls. Paige, also presented herself as sexually knowledgeable in this way, for example 
reporting in class that the porn star, Jenna Jameson, who ‘never does anal’ was her hero. While she 
did not gain approval for this display, it helped her present herself as a sexual subject, and it is 
important to recognise the possibilities for girls of pleasure and power in these actions (see Renold 
& Ringrose, 2011). 
How slags are treated 
Amir: Like with Serena, people call her a sket. But then she makes it worse for herself 
because of her actions. 
Author: What actions? 
Amir: That’s explicit content. 
Kadia: The thing about Serena is that she can’t say no, so then people come up to her and 
then she gets an even worse reputation. 
9 
 
Being named a slag, and this being accepted as legitimate by peers, can be understood as a 
performative act—as pupils make clear, it changes the criteria by which a person is judged and the 
way they act towards her. A ‘bad reputation’ becomes the circulating evidence of this act of naming 
(Munn, 1986). Pupils recognised two main kinds of changed practice towards the slag; sanction and 
the increased sexual advances of boys. The pupils’ main sanction was to stop talking to the person 
named a slag. This withdrawal of interaction had great force in the context of intense sociality. 
Sanction was justified both in terms of the judged wrongness of the actions, but also the potential of 
these actions to reflect badly on people associated with them. When the Man-dom, the popular 
boys, stopped talking to Kadia, she explained to me, ‘we’re like their girls, I think they feel we kind of 
represent them so if we do things that make them look bad then they don’t like it’. 
At the same time, while most pupils recognised the general legitimacy of sanctioning peers, specific 
instances of sanction were up for debate. For example, Kadia rejected the legitimacy of the Man-
dom’s sanctions, arguing, ‘What I did wasn’t bad, it was just something between two people.’ At the 
same time she still judged according to the slag criteria (see Stafford, 2010). These instances of 
sanction by peers suggest the cumulative effects of ethical action. Pupils were aware that not only 
individuals, but also peer groups, year groups and schools could be named ‘skettish’. The importance 
of acting on ethical judgements becomes a matter of collective concern, to preserve reputation, as 
well as punish the individual. 
The treatment of slags also needs to be recognised within the conventions of visibility in school. High 
status pupils are visible, seen and known through the year, while low status pupils are expected to 
be ‘invisible’. As Lambek notes, ‘…the ethical is to be distinguished not only from what is specifically 
unethical but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, from simple indifference’ (2010b, p. 54). There 
was more at stake if visible girls got named slags with the potential to undermine the year group as 
an ethical collective. 
Being named a slag bestowed visibility to low status pupils, but there was illegitimacy in becoming 
visible for the wrong reasons. Although, as Caroline recognises, even the wrong kind of visibility 
might be more appealing than invisibility: 
 Some people become more popular with it. Like if a younger girl is a slag then older guys 
will start to hang around her a lot more. But no one is going to view anyone nicely because 
of it, they’re always going to view people negatively.… I think most girls who do that are 
insecure anyway, that’s what they want, they want the attention and they think that they’re 
getting it, they don’t realise they’ll be viewed negatively. 
The increased attention shown to a ‘slag’ by boys was understood in terms of the masculine criteria, 
that pretty much all sex is good sex. On the one hand, boys are invested in a collective ethical project 
of reputation; judging and acting on this criteria of slagginess. On the other, the slag appears to offer 
achievable sex, allowing them to prove themselves as ‘good men’. However, these courses of action 
are not mutually exclusive; it is possible to pursue a girl for the aim of sex, while continuing to 
articulate her as a slag: 
Caroline: If a girl is a slag than guys will start to hang around her a lot more. 
James: The boys will have a field day. 
Caroline: They’re just out for what they can get I suppose, but then afterwards 
they’ll call them a slut. 
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These issues are discussed by Michael, James and Dominic. Michael contemplates that, ‘boys should 
actually love the idea of sluts’, but in the end he concludes otherwise, ‘when we truly like girls we 
don’t like to imagine them as a slut’. And although relations with a ‘slut’ would lead to sex, a 
relationship with them is seen to taint the boy. Dominic, ‘that’s the thing, no guy genuinely wants to 
go out with a slut properly’. ‘Yeah’, confirms Richard, ‘they’d get the mick taken out of them a lot for 
it’. 
Levels of reflection 
So far I have argued that through action and judgement, pupils manifest the figure of the slag as 
potent evidence of feminine transgression. At the same time however, they were also reflecting on 
the collective sexual ethics and evaluating them in relation to other ethical judgements, such as 
‘fairness’. As Keane notes, ‘Ethics is not all of one order. Sometimes we are in the midst of action; 
sometimes we stand apart from it’ (2010, p. 69). 
At times, ‘slaggy’ actions, even when judged as such, were also judged according to more general 
criteria of truthfulness and ‘being true to yourself’. 
Jerome: There was this girl and we asked that and she was like ‘yeah’ and she admitted it, ‘I 
don’t care what anyone thinks of me’ than she was automatically respected, she wasn’t 
respected for what she did, she was respected for what she said when they caught her 
because she still carried on with who she was. Whereas if there’s a girl and she did 
something and everyone knows it, and she denies it, then that’s worse. 
A further level of reflection was a commentary on sexual double standards, noted by both boys and 
girls. For example, Jerome commented, ‘I think it’s bad really, that girls mainly get labelled as sluts, 
when it’s guys who actually do it most of the time, so it’s really hypocritical.’ 
As pupils progressed through school into older years, the potency of the slag discourse diminished, 
and the ethics of sexuality became less of a collective project of evaluation and sanction. Jane, aged 
18 and about to leave school, reflects on why this might be: 
I think it’s because they’re too young, before they have any experience of sex they use it 
[the slag discourse] as something. But when you get older they think ‘oh yeah, this is quite 
fun’. Everyone was prudes before, but they were only prudish because they didn’t have any 
experience of it. 
Similarly, boys from Year 11 identified the newness of sex as an important factor in the saliency of 
discourses of sexual impropriety: 
James: It’s just a new thing, so it’s got that novelty factor and everyone is kind of obsessed. 
When everyone gets used to it, it doesn’t lose any value but it’s… 
Richard: Because as soon as something is new people have a really strong opinion on it. But 
as soon as they get used to it will become less important, it will be a bad thing but not as bad 
as it was. 
James: It’s like when a kid’s got a new toy and they go over the top with it and end up 
breaking it, it’s sort of like that. 
Dominic adds: It’s all to do with normalcy… 
11 
 
Richard agreeing: At secondary school if you do something out of the ordinary than you’re 
gay or if you’re a woman then you’re a slut, it’s like you have to be normal, you can’t be out 
of the ordinary, but outside school, after school, I think people will kind of accept it more. 
We might consider how these acts of reflection are also performative, leading to a recalibration of 
criteria, following which the slag criteria is less likely to be applied, is less forceful and/or is less likely 
to lead to peer sanction. As the boys suggest, sex itself might be considered a performative act that 
can recalibrate criteria, as it becomes more ‘normal’ as peers get older. 
Conclusion 
Starting from action, ethics emerge as an intrinsic part of sociality. Attention to the ethical 
dimensions of peer interactions in school, in this case in relation to sex and sexuality, highlights that 
pupils, like most people, are concerned with right and wrong, good and bad. As I have illustrated, the 
slag discourse is not only applied to judgements of ‘bad sex’, grounded in a gendered criteria, but 
also comes to stand for more general transgressions of appropriate speech and action, again judged 
according to gender. ‘Slag’ (like ‘gay’) is a performative and efficacious discourse because it can 
name both sexuality and gender as wrong and change the criteria from which the ‘slag’ is judged and 
related to. Moreover, the fact that practices of sexuality and gender are judged in ethical terms is 
what gives the judgments such force, helping us to recognise the imperatives by which young people 
are making themselves into appropriate and acceptable sexual and gendered people. 
The sexualisation discourse takes the sex-saturated media as its starting place and assumes a 
damaging impact on the moral development of passive young people. In contrast, an ethnographic 
perspective, using a framework of ‘ordinary ethics’, enables us to recognise the multiplicity of ethical 
actions through which pupils evince strong and clear sexual ethics within school. Contradicting the 
rhetoric of crisis, the focus on ethical action enables a more subtle understanding of change, 
continuity and moral recalibration. 
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Notes 
1. In this article I use morality and ethics interchangeably. As Lambek writes ‘the many interesting distinctions 
made between ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ in the…literature are not consistent with one another. Maintaining such 
a distinction is thus either to lead to confusion or to limit discussion to the province of one thinker (2010a, p. 
9). 
2. The British Social Attitudes survey shows that since the 1980s, pre-marital heterosexual relations are 
accepted by the majority, there is a decrease in the average age in first sex and an increase in the average 
number of sexual partners (cited in Jackson & Scott, 2004). 
3. Charles also connects this literature with the ‘broader girlhood studies scholarship, highlighting connections 
between girlhood, girl power and neoliberal subjectivities, cannot be ignored within research exploring young 
femininities, sexualities and schooling today’ (2010, p. 35). 
4. While my research necessarily captures only one contemporary moment, subtle recalibrations of the 
relative importance of marriage to ethically ‘good sex’ are suggested by reference to past empirical studies, for 
example Willis (1977, p. 44) and Lees (1986). 
5. There is also a ‘lesbian discourse’, again denoting ‘not enough’, for example applied to girls who do not 
engage in feminine activities of appearance, or heterosexual activities like flirting. But this was used much less 
often by pupils. 
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